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Time Is Money
Roy L. Wood 
Program managers typically focus on controlling costs 
and delivering a quality product. The acquisition stool’s 
third leg—program schedule—appears to be a resource 
that can be slipped to accommodate unstable funding 
or technical difficulties. Despite studies linking high 
program cost and long schedules, few major defense 
acquisition programs are completed in less than a 
decade. Programs with longer schedules experience 
further schedule slips, exacerbating the problem. This 
article is based on research presented at the 2012 Naval 
Postgraduate School’s 9th Annual Research Symposium. 
It includes a review of the extant literature on cost and 
schedule relationships, presents analysis of a survey of 
program manager perceptions and master schedule 
usage, and examines why schedules may be problematic 
to acquisition success.
I 
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Program success is traditionally measured by cost, schedule, and 
performance. When issues arise, trade-offs between these three are 
made; conventional wisdom, however, says the program manager (PM) 
can generally preserve only two of the three. For example, if current 
budgets are cut, then programs are forced either to give up some “bells 
and whistles” in performance, or lower the spend rate and stretch out the 
program schedule. If the program schedule is delayed for reasons such 
as lagging technology readiness or testing failures, then program costs 
will rise or the scope of the program’s content will have to be sacrificed.
When making such trade-offs, reasonably good tools and techniques 
are available for estimating cost impacts and performance trades are 
usually understandable. However, when it comes to program schedules, 
trade-offs can be much less clear and the impacts more difficult to deter-
mine. “Working harder” or placing more “management emphasis” on an 
area are often viewed as ways to improve performance and “compress” 
schedules to remain on track. These ideas can lead to an overly optimis-
tic attitude that, unlike money, time is somehow elastic and forgiving. 
This also leads to a skewed perception about the value of program time 
in the future versus the present. Resource problems in the near term 
are often “solved” by pushing work into the future, moving milestones 
forward while keeping the program end date static, while simultane-
ously compressing all the activities in between. This forces activities to 
become more concurrent and increases the complexity of coordinating 
and synchronizing program activities.
While most of us have heard the truism that “time 
is money,” little evidence has emerged that PMs 
perceive aggressively managing time and schedules 
can help control costs.
Purpose
This article explores the relationship between program time and cost. 
While most of us have heard the truism that “time is money,” little evidence 
has emerged that PMs perceive aggressively managing time and schedules 
can help control costs. As an exploratory effort, this research examined 
the literature on program scheduling, reasons program schedules were 
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not adhered to, and the relationship of program schedules to cost and 
program performance. Using a survey of 73 PMs attending senior courses 
at the Defense Acquisition University in February 2012, this article also 
examines PM uses and attitudes toward their own program schedules.
Length of a Program  
Contributes to Program Cost
The Packard Commission noted in 1986 that, “an unreasonably long 
acquisition cycle . . . is a central problem from which most other acqui-
sition problems stem” (p. 8). Echoing this sentiment 20 years later, the 
Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment report recommended 
that, instead of waiting decades for 100 percent performance, programs 
be held to a “time-certain development” period of 6 years from the initial 
milestone (MS-A) to delivery of a militarily useful capability (Kadish, 
2006, p. 12). The report enumerates some of the benefits of shorter 
development cycles:
• Operators with a basic capability in hand would gain a bet-
ter understanding of full requirements to be inserted in 
future increments.
• Technology in the initial design would be at a higher readi-
ness level, and would mature during the period between first 
deliveries and subsequent increments.
• New requirements and technologies would be intention-
ally inserted in later increments, removing the temptation 
to perturb the current development and adding stability to 
the acquisition.
• Reducing time in development would also help add funding 
stability across the entire program portfolio (Kadish, 2006, 
pp. 12–13).
In a dissertation study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
of 154 defense projects, McNutt (1998) found that cost increased on a 
4th power scale with development time. Figure 1 shows a derivation of 
McNutt’s “best fit” power relationship on a linear plot. One can observe 
that the “knee in the curve” where costs begin to escalate significantly is 
around 6.5 years, indicating that costs for programs with schedules that 
extend beyond this point risk quickly becoming unaffordable.
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More recently, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics issued an update—Better Buying Power 2.0—
that recognizes, and proposes to reduce, some of the factors that increase 
program development (Kendall, 2012). According to the memorandum, 
these include “oversight activities, funding stability, contracting lead 
time, requirements processes, technical complexity, use of risk reduc-
tion factors, and testing requirements” (p. 5). Some of those factors are 
examined in this article.
Complex Technical Requirements
A number of reasons may explain why the length of a program 
impacts its cost so dramatically. First, a longer schedule may be an 
acknowledgement of complex technological requirements that contribute 
to a program’s developmental challenges. Programs like the F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter or the DDG-1000 naval destroyer with substantial capa-
bility needs, advanced technology, unique features, or with significant 
integration or interdependencies with other programs, can be expected 
from the outset to take longer to develop, cost more, and have greater risk.
Evolving requirements and technology advancements. 
Programs with long timelines may also be subject to more requirements 
changes as threats and technologies evolve over time. As new threats 
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emerge during a program’s development, there would be a need to try 
to address those threats by adding or refining the delivered system’s 
capabilities.
Requirements changes during a program’s lifetime can have sub-
stantial impact on schedule and cost. In a recent Center for Strategic 
and International Studies analysis, $37 billion of cost overruns in the 
major defense acquisition program portfolio are linked to schedule, and 
the report notes that defense contractors cite requirements changes late 
in a program as a major cause of schedule impacts (Berteau, Hofbauer, 
Sanders, & Ben-Ari, 2010).
Similarly, a recent industry white paper noted, “frequent and ‘inside 
lead time’ changes to program requirements and production schedules 
are major obstacles to successful cost and schedule attainment for 
most aerospace and defense programs” (Archstone Consulting, 2012). 
This assertion is backed up by the 2008 Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) analysis of defense weapons systems, which states that 
“63 percent of the programs we received data from had requirements 
changes after system development began. These programs encountered 
cost increases of 72 percent, while costs grew by 11 percent among those 
programs that did not change requirements” (p. 5).
When requirements changes occur during development, replanning 
and rework follow. New requirements must be flowed down as allocated 
functions via the systems engineering process. This becomes particu-
larly challenging after Critical Design Review when a system’s baseline 
is approved and the system is deemed ready to proceed to fabrication, 
demonstration, and test. Any new requirements must be engineered 
and integrated as well as possible into existing program plans. This 
adds complexity and takes time and care. Drawings and specifications 
must be revised, schedules and task budgets altered, test plans modi-
fied, and resources allocated or shifted to attend to new or modified 
tasks. In almost any conceivable circumstance, wasted prior effort will 
be scrapped and rework will be required to accommodate new changes, 
exacerbating the delay and disruption created by the new requirements.
Requirements changes during a program’s lifetime 
can have substantial impact on schedule and cost.
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Also, given the relatively few new program starts, the temptation is 
ever present for requirements managers and technologists to demand 
more capabilities in each new program. The need to meet forecasted 
future threats can also drive an appetite among users toward ever 
greater technical capabilities. Stressing requirements for the Air Force’s 
fifth-generation fighter, the F-22 Raptor, for example, included stealthy 
titanium and composite structure, advanced avionics, active-array radar, 
supersonic cruise, and other enabling technologies. Likewise, the Navy’s 
Zumwalt-class destroyer included requirements for reduced crew size, 
advanced active-array radar, integrated power system, electric drive, 
stealthy hull, integrated superstructure, 155 mm gun, and peripheral 
launching system. Many of these technologies were developed and 
matured concurrently during the program engineering and manufactur-
ing development phases (Francis, 2005; GAO, 1998).
Schedule and cost uncertainty are high for new technology devel-
opment, but this uncertainty becomes a substantial risk when overlaid 
on program milestones that depend upon successful delivery of the 
technology to support testing and fielding a new system. When several 
new technology developments are ongoing, as in the case of the F-22 and 
the Zumwalt destroyer, this uncertainty multiplies, and orchestration 
of technology insertion becomes extremely challenging. It should be of 
little surprise that both these programs delivered substantially late and 
over budget (Bolkcom, 2009; O’Rourke, 2012).
Budget churn. Unstable funding has often been blamed for pro-
gram schedule and cost issues. Langbein (2004) cites three different 
types of funding instability that impact programs. The first is perhaps 
the most obvious—quantity of dollars. These are programs with insuf-
ficient total funding to perform the required tasks to deliver the system. 
Underfunded programs can be caused by poor cost estimating for the 
funding that is needed by the program, unforeseen and unbudgeted 
changes, or overly optimistic cost targets. In defense acquisition, two 
other, less obvious pitfalls—“color” of money and timing of money—can 
create program instability and schedule problems.
In every program, defense managers must break down total fund-
ing into its constituent functions and categories of funding for specific 
portions of the program. Research and development, procurement, 
operations and maintenance, shipbuilding and conversion, and other 
“colors” of money must be appropriately aligned to fund the associated 
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tasks in the program. At times, a program may have sufficient overall 
funding, but an incorrect allocation within the colors of money. The PM 
may find shortfalls in some areas and surpluses in others, but not have 
the authority to move the Congressionally appropriated dollars from 
one account to another. These shortfalls can stop activities in parts of 
the program and create overall delays. Timing of funding can also cre-
ate similar problems. Program budgets are closely aligned with planned 
work in any given year. If challenges or opportunities arise within the 
year of execution, current year funding may not be sufficient to accom-
modate new funding requirements, again creating potential delay and 
disruption to the program schedule.
In each of these cases, program schedules must be replanned to 
accommodate different funding realities. Reprogramming or repur-
posing current year funding is generally not simple or quick. Requests 
for more, or different, funding can take up to 2 years to realize through 
the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system. Tasks 
must be trimmed in the current year and work adjusted so the finan-
cial impacts can be addressed over the longer term. The results may be 
that key events and milestones are missed, concurrency increases, and 
opportunities are lost.
Longer programs potentially suffer greater budgetary churn. Each 
new fiscal year presents an opportunity for decision makers outside 
the program to make funding “adjustments” that perturb the program’s 
overall performance. Likewise, longer programs with large budgets can 
be tempting targets for comptrollers or Congress.
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Developing Schedules
The Scheduling Process
The schedule development process itself may be a culprit in program 
cost overruns. Ideally, program schedules are developed in a rational 
and linear manner. Program requirements are analyzed and developed 
through the iterative systems engineering process, allocating required 
functions to be performed by the system’s hardware, software, and 
operators. A work breakdown structure (WBS) is created, assigning 
those functions to subsystems and components. At the lowest level of 
the WBS, work packages are developed that allow accurate estimation 
of the resources—dollars, time, and manpower/expertise—required to 
build, test, and deliver the hardware or software widget. Rolling up these 
detailed resource requirements to higher levels of the WBS, then, allows 
the program management team to create an overall program budget esti-
mate, resource-loaded schedule, and program manpower estimate. The 
resource-loaded schedule will show each task with its estimated dura-
tion and linkages to other tasks to show dependencies (e.g., Task B cannot 
start until Task A is complete), major milestones where tasks culminate 
in a defining program event, the calculated program end date, and associ-
ated critical path. If each task is then given the appropriate resources and 
completes within its estimated timeframe, then the program execution 
proceeds from start to finish with nary a problem.
Unfortunately, this is generally not how program schedules are con-
structed. Project end dates are more often arrived at from a capability 
“need date” established early in the program by the user or sponsor. In 
the survey of program management students at the Defense Acquisition 
University in 2011, only 18 percent reported that their program end date 
was determined through a roll-up of task level schedules, while 58 per-
cent reported end dates determined by need.
Apparently, herein lies the source of some inherent program prob-
lems. In this method of program end date determination, the need date or 
end date is fixed and the program milestones are “backed out” from there. 
Other project tasks are fitted into the milestone scheme, along with what-
ever concurrency and optimism are needed to make the schedule “work.” 
Fully 82 percent of the program management students participating in 
the DAU survey reported that their program schedules contained some 
to significant concurrency with moderate to high schedule risk.
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In execution, to stay on schedule programs must accept risks, and, 
as the GAO has noted in its annual Assessments of Selected Weapons 
Programs, proceed through milestones before achieving requisite design 
and engineering maturity (GAO, 2009, 2010, 2011). This results in 
programs being, “at a higher risk for cost growth and schedule delays” 
(GAO, 2011).
Scheduling processes are not well understood or executed. 
The process of scheduling itself is difficult and may not always be as 
useful as it could be as a key project management tool. The National 
Defense Industrial Association (NDIA)’s Industrial Committee for 
Project Management recognized that the art of scheduling for complex 
projects was problematic for government programs and chartered the 
Program Planning and Scheduling Subcommittee to create the Planning 
and Scheduling Excellence Guide (NDIA, 2012). This guide was designed 
to assist government and industry in creating more useful, consistent, 
and standardized integrated master schedules (IMS) using the prin-
ciples of the internationally recognized standard, Generally Accepted 
Scheduling Practices. The guide emphasizes practical skills and applica-
tion of sound scheduling principles to create a schedule that models the 
acquisition plan, provides tips for schedule maintenance, and advice for 
project managers to use the IMS more appropriately to manage a complex 
government program.
The survey of PMs at the Defense Acquisition University revealed 
some insights into how schedules are viewed by current managers. 
Ninety-six percent of those polled reported that having an integrated and 
up-to-date schedule is critical to running their programs, and two-thirds 
Ninety-six percent of those polled reported that 
having an integrated and up-to-date schedule  
is critical to running their programs, and 
two-thirds express confidence in the accuracy  
of their master schedules.
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express confidence in the accuracy of their master schedules. However, 
less than half reported that their schedule is accurately resource-loaded, 
and only 51 percent are confident their schedule includes all the work 
required to be done by government and contractors. These results seem 
to be inconsistent and perhaps contradictory. Only half responded that 
their schedules are complete and accurate, yet most have confidence in 
the schedule and overwhelmingly affirm its importance to their pro-
gram’s success! The Table shown here summarizes these views.
Similarly, in execution, 56 percent responded that their schedule is 
realistic and achievable, while 40 percent report that their programs are 
behind schedule. When faced with hypothetical budget cuts, 48 percent 
indicated they would defer requirements or capabilities, while only 20 
percent would slip schedule as a preferred method to manage overruns. 
However, the PMs assigned the highest priority for their programs as 
ensuring quality and performance of their products, and they ranked 
controlling program scope last in relative priority. Again, while their 
responses to questions of importance align closely with current policies 
of adjusting scope to budget, the practical priorities on performance and 
scope, as reported by the PMs, would seem contradictory.









Having an integrated and up-to-date 
schedule is critical to running my 
program. 96% 4%
I have confidence in the accuracy of 
my master schedule. 65% 35%
My schedule is accurately resource-
loaded. 45% 55%
My program schedule is realistic and 
achievable. 56% 44%
My schedule includes all required 
work, including that of government 
organizations, all contractors, and 
subcontractors. 51% 49%
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Program problems can be created when program 
teams and stakeholders underestimate the 
challenges and overestimate their abilities to 
deliver on “success-oriented,” aggressive schedules.
Finally, when the statement is posed, “Maintaining an accurate 
detailed schedule is too labor-intensive and costly for the value,” fewer 
than 10 percent agreed or strongly agreed. When asked about current pro-
gram issues, respondents reported difficulty in synchronizing schedules 
among players second only to unstable funding. Again, this seems to indi-
cate the importance PMs place on the theoretical value of their IMS, and 
a recognition that large program scheduling is, in practice, challenging.
Overoptimism can lengthen program schedules and increase 
costs. Given that many program end dates are set well before any of 
the work begins, perceived necessity, concurrency, and optimism drive 
milestone schedules and tasks. Once the analysis of the work that must 
be accomplished is underway, tremendous pressure is pervasive in keep-
ing to original agreements and promises to deliver, however unrealistic. 
In the “Conspiracy of Optimism” white paper, the International Centre 
for Complex Project Management (ICCPM, 2010) authors explain:
Once initial project budgets and schedules are set, based on such 
estimates, they have immense staying power, driven by collective 
unrealistic expectations, even to the extent that over time, sys-
tem functionality and project resources are sacrificed in order 
to achieve what was unobtainable in the first place.
Program problems can be created when program teams and stake-
holders underestimate the challenges and overestimate their abilities 
to deliver on “success-oriented,” aggressive schedules. This optimistic 
thinking necessarily flows down from the government to the system 
contractors. Once the government team has fallen into its own overly 
optimistic decision trap, contract requests for proposal are written based 
on the ill-conceived plan, and contractors then come to the table hoping 
to have the most attractive bid to meet the government’s ill-conceived 
expectations. Unfortunately, this also often creates an environment 
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where realistic assessments of cost and schedule are undervalued, and 
contractors who refuse to join in on the conspiracy risk losing the job 
(Eden, Ackermann, & Williams, 2005):
It is common for commercial considerations to lead to “doc-
toring ” of the estimate in order to drive estimated costs 
down—particularly where there are strategic reasons for want-
ing to win that particular bid. Later, at the planning stage, this 
“doctoring” is forgotten and unrealistic plans are made. As the 
project unfolds, this lack of realism is very likely to play one of 
the most significant and unattributed roles in increased costs. 
Underestimating at the planning stage is one of the most com-
mon triggers for cost escalation . . . . (p. 19)
Kahneman (2011) argues that the optimism bias is inherent and 
pervasive in individuals and teams taking risks under conditions of 
uncertainty or ambiguity. He offers that remedies to this bias are often 
gained through using a comparison of timelines for similar prior projects 
as a baseline for the current one, or getting an outside view from a third 
party who may be able to assess the reasonableness of project estimates. 
He also encourages the practice of “pre-mortems,” where the project 
team envisions future project failure and offers all the things that might 
have caused it (p. 264). This exercise may empower the team to bring to 
light issues that have not been previously considered (or ignored), help 
break groupthink, and encourage the team to accept evidence of overop-
timism in the project’s planning.
Conclusions
While the quantitative evidence linking schedule to cost is murky, 
most of the literature agrees qualitatively that longer programs incur 
greater costs and cost overruns. Longer programs tend to be more com-
plex and include significant technology development efforts. They are 
more susceptible to requirements changes and budget churn. Longer 
programs seem to have an affective component where time is under-
valued and decisions can be deferred. Pushing work into the future can 
create a bow wave of work that must then be accomplished with more 
concurrency, thereby generating the need to apply additional resources 
in an attempt to meet the program delivery date. This limits the pro-
gram’s cost-schedule-performance trade-space and can lead to even 
greater churn.
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Several potential remedies have been suggested by the literature. 
First, where possible, shorten program timelines from inception to 
delivery of a usable capability (a goal should be no longer than 6-1/2  years). 
This would expose higher risk requirements and technology develop-
ment that could be done within a program and reduce the opportunities 
for requirements changes. Shortened programs would facilitate more 
accurate cost and schedule estimates, and fewer budget cycles would 
limit the opportunities for comptrollers and Congress to change program 
funding profiles.
Next, artificial program “need dates” should be compared with a 
rational bottom-up schedule derived from the WBS and systems engi-
neering process. The bottom-up analysis should then inform a more 
reasonable program delivery date and moderate the amount of pro-
gram concurrency. Similarly, overoptimism must also be tempered by 
objectively comparing current plans and schedules with similar past 
programs. Further, from the survey of senior defense PMs, it appears, at 
least in principle, that they value and appreciate the utility of good inte-
grated schedules. However, it appears equally likely that inconsistencies 
and contradictions exist in how PMs use schedules in actual practice. 
These results imply that there may be a need for better training and a 
renewed focus on schedule development and management. Finally, PMs 
and acquisition leaders must understand and appreciate the linkage of 
cost and schedule, and the value of time to program success. Time, after 
all, is money.
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